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Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche
Jon Moline., University of Wisconsinr October 14, 1976
What were the parts of the psyche posited by Plato in thé Republic? The question
calls not for a list but for an account of the grounds on which Plato posited and distin
guished such parts. It calls for an account of their nature and role in his system.
We are not lacking in attempts at such an account. These parts have been termed
"faculties", "principles", "activities", "aspects", "instances", and "levels" of the
psyche. Their nature and role have been characterized in ways influenced as much perhaps
by the connotations of these terms as by the details of Plato's text. Yet scholars have
long known better. Ritter, Taylor and Graeser, to name only three, have plainly warned of
the confusions that result from characterizing the parts Plato posits as if they were psy
chological divisions more familiar to us.
Unhappily, to warn of possible confusions is not sufficient to deliver us from them,
for they continue to be encouraged by familiar works of interpretation. Perhaps the most
common of these confusions results from the suggestion that the parts of the psyche posited
by Plato were facilities ~ "powers" or "capacities" on the order of those posited by Aristotle
and modern psychologists.
It will be helpful in dispelling this and other such confusions
to ask the question, "What were the parts of the psyche posited by Plato?", and to minimize
the seductive influence of any later psychological terminology in answering it. The answer
can then be applied to illuminate related themes in later dialogues, especially the Phaedrus.
I
Any plausible answer to the question must be bound up with Plato's theory of justice.
At 386D-E and again at 435A-B Plato lays down the hypothesis that justice in the^polis and
justice in the individual are the same. This hypothesis dominates the dialogue.
By 435A-B
Plato has argued at length that justice in the polis is a harmony of |pecialized function
obtaining among distinct and potentially seditious classes of agents.
The question Plato must explore from 435B on is whether or not the psyche, like the
polis, actually contains distinct and usually seditious agents. The stakes riding on the
answer are by this point high. Justice in the polis he makes out to be a certain relation
among plausibly real and distinct relata. If the psyche does not contain equally real and
distinct relata/ justice there cannot be the same as justice in the polis, and Plato has
wasted 3 1/2 books. In effect he recognizes these stakes at 434D6-7.
What Plato needs in order to show that he has not been exploring a blind alley must
not be minimized. Nothing less than a structural and functional isomorphism between polis
and psyche will do. It would be an understatement t^en to say that on Plato's view there
must be an analogy between the polis and the psyche.
The appearance of being one thing
must prove as deceptive for the psyche as it did for the ordinary polis at 422E-423A. The
psyche must upon examination prove to be literally complex, and literally reducible to parts
which are independent of one another in the sense that they can stand in direct conflict
as political factions do.
In his examination and argument Plato employs both formal and observational premises.
At 430E-431A he comments upon the phenomenon we call self-control:
... the expression "self-control" is laughable, for the controller of self and the
self that is weaker and is controlled is the same person ... But ... the expression
seems to want to indicate that in the psyche of the person himself there is a better
and a worse part; whenever what is by nature the better part is in control of the
worse, this is expressed by saying that the person is self-controlled or master of
himself, and this is a term of praise. When, on the other hand, the smaller and
better part, owing to poor upbringing or bad company, is over-powered by the larger
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and worse, this is made a reproach and is called^being defeated by oneself, and a
person in that situation is called uncontrolled.
^he view of self-control suggested here is one Plato continues to hold as late as the
Laws.
As stated here in the Republic it prepares the way for Plato's formal argument for
regarding the psyche as literally complex and isomorphic to the polis. That argument pro
ceeds in several steps which we may paraphrase as follows:
1) .

It is plain that the same thing will not do or suffer opposites in relation to
the same thing in the same respect and at the same time (435B6-8) . Such opposites
would be, e.g., assenting and dissenting, aiming at something and rejecting it,
embracing and avoiding (437B1-3).

2) .

So if perhaps one finds such opposites arising in oneself, one will not be "the
same thing" but a plurality (436B8-C1).

3) .

One does find such opposites arising in oneself, since
V
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a) . Anger (Ή)ν opyj'jv") sometimes combats appetites Λ
ef t t Ou^Cous) as one alien thing does another (440A6-7) .
b) .

Often we observe that when appetites compel a person contrary to the
'calculativa' part (*Tov* X o ^ lct^ o v ), he rebukes himself (440A9-B1) .

c) .

The 'spirited' part (Ίνο O v fic & t& e s ) ± s by nature the ally of thj^
'calculativa' unless it is perverted by poor nurture (441A2-4).

/Λ
ν'
There is evidence then of "civil war in the psyche" ('Ttjs
S β 'Τ & β 'ίϊ
440E5), a conflict requiring distinct and alien contestants. Evidence of
such conflict may be observed not merely in oneself but in others. Thus,
in Leontius' psyche there occurred a conflict between a part interested in
viewinj^a pile of corpses and a part opposed to this as disgraceful (439E440A) .
This conflict was evinced in his behavior.

4) .

It follows then that the psyche is indeed complex and faction-ridden in precisely
the way the polis had proved to be earlier (441C5-7). In its parts the psyche
is isomorphic to the polis, for "the same kind of parts and the same number of
parts are to be found in the polis and in the psyche of each of us" (441C6-7).

5) .

The psyche and polis are isomorphic in their states or conditions, and in the
origin of these: "It necessarily follows that the individual is wise in the same
way, and in the same part of himself, as the city.
... And the part which makes
the individual brave is the same as that which makes the city brave, and in the
same manner, and everything which makes for virtue is the same in b o t h ........ a
man is just in the same way as a city is just.
...the cj£y was just because each
of the three classes in it was fulfilling its own task."

Two parallel pieces of reduction take place in Bk. IV. First Plato reduces a polis
to its parts and the characteristics of a pölis to the characteristics and relations of
its parts. At 435E Socrates says.
It would be laughable if anyone thought that the appearance of spiritedness in a
polis is not derived from J^e individuals in it, as with those in Thrace or Scythia
or generally in the North.
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At 428E it is claimed that if a polis seems wise as a whole/ this is owing to the
or understanding found in its smallest part, the class of guardians. It is that class which
is influential when the polis is said to display wisdom. And this influence is clearly lit
erals the guardians cause certain wise things to be done and prevent the doing of unwise
ones. Hence Plato is not merely trafficking in points of informal logic. The division into
parts is likewise literal. The appearance that the polis as a whole is wise is deceptive,
for it contains parts which lack wisdom, and if such parts had usurped the place of the
wise part and had directed the behavior of the whole, the polis would have lacked wisdom.
Secondly, at 435E Socrates affijip that this same pattern of reductive argument is to
be applied to the individual person.
Again, this neither is nor could be a loose analogy
if Plato's arguments are to go through. It is to be taken as a piece of sober theorizing,
and taken as literally as any piece of theorizing in the dialogues. There are many indica
tions of this. For example, at 443C-D, with none of the hints or warnings with which Plato
usually surrounds self-consciously figurative langage, an overt act of a person is described
as "the overt action of the thing that is in one".
At 436A Plato had laid it down as one
of two hypotheses (the one later accepted) that the parts of the psyche are the entities
responsible when we start or move. Again at 439C-D overt conduct is said to mirror .
or be an image of inner activity. And in applying this theory later in the Republic to
assess the happiness or misery of the tyrant and the causes of the tyrant's actions, Socrates
is made to remark that the tyrant's external acts betray the miserable internal economy of
the tyrant's psyche to the informed observer who is able to consider the entire psyche.
The person who is a tyrant is so because he contains a tyrant, jgd it rules harshly over
other, quite unwilling subjects even within the tyrant himself.
Plato suggests at 577A-B
that he has grounded this view on the observation of tyrants in their unguarded moments,
presumably those in which the miserable state of their oppressed parts and the fearful
state of the oppressing ones are evident.
There is no blinking the fact that Plato was attempting to account causally for per
sons' actions, not analyze concepts. One does not appeal to observations of tyrants in
their unguarded moments to substantiate a piece of conceptual analysis. Plato is out to
account causally not just for isolated actions but for the overall direction (or lack of
it) in the life a person leads. This is evident at 581B-C, where Socrates is made to claim
that there are three sorts of people and three corresponding sorts of lives. An individual
is of one of these three sorts and leads the life he or she does because of the part of the
psyche which rules the others in that individual's psyche. Talk of "rule" is plainly causal
and explanatory in force, and given the isomorphism of polis and psyche that Plato posjt^s
and requires for his argument, we are to take it as straightforward, not metaphorical.
Talk of the rule of one part over others and of the difficulty the best part has in
achieving it in the face of efforts by the other parts to usurp its role underscores Plato's
very ground for believing there are parts. The sole ground on which Plajg distinguishes
parts of the psyche is the psyche's susceptibility to internal conflict.
Susceptibility
to internal conflict on this view shows that the psyche cannot be one entity.
The "cannot"
here is logical: if x is both G and H, and anything which is H is not G, then it would fol
low ¡that X is both G and not G, which cannot be the case. If x nevertheless seems to be
both G and not G, we must look for seams in x; x cannot conceivably be simple. Thus if
Leontius both wants to view corpses and despises corpse-viewing, and if x's despising corpse
viewing entails x's not wanting to view corpses, "Leontius" is the name of at least two
entities deceptively packaged as one.
11
We have noted that Plato divided human beings into classes in accordance with their
predominant desires or ultimate aims. He argues at 485D-E and 486C that the desire that
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or ability. One is the kind of person one is owing to one's predominant desire. One may
have others, however. Farmers, as we see at 374A-P, are able to form something they might
call an army to defend the polis, and may even want to do this, but they are likely to do
a poor job of it, and had best cater to appetite by growing food and leave defense to strongspirited, fearless professional soldiers (375A9-B3). Function varies not precisely with
capacity in any minimal sense of "capacity" but with competence. At 353A Plato indicates
that a thing's function is shown by what it alone can do or by what it can do better than
anything else. In his political thought, it is the second indication of function which is
relevant. The auxiliaries have the protective function they do not because craftsmen can
not wield weapons but because the auxiliaries can perform this function better than anyone
else. There would be no occasion for Plato's principle of specialization if citizens of
diverse classes could not overlap at a minimal level in their capacities and their desires.
The occasion for this principle is the widespread
in the Quinary polis.
Plato sees clearly the distinction between minimal capacity and competence.
Since Plato regards the psyche as isomorphic to a polis composed of people capable of
, it would be odd if he chose an entirely different principle of specializa
tion for the parts of the psyche than the very principle he had invoked for the parts of
the polis — the^çrinciple that one is to do what one is competent to do and leave other
tasks to others.
Yet this odd shift in principles of specialization has been attributed
to Plato by interpreters who characterize the parts of the psyche he posits as fag^lties.
A faculty, by definition, is a capacity for the one thing its name would suggest.
"Appetite" on a facultist view would be a capacity for a certain sort of desire and nothing
else; "Reason" would be simply and solely a capacity for reasoning. Thus a faculty's 'spe
cialization of function* would be the automatic and trivial result of its incapacity to do
anything its name did not suggest.
Such triviality is not uncommonly credited to Plato by interpreters and translators
who speak of the parts of the psyche as if they were faculties.
But this will not fit
the text. Talk of one faculty's usurping the function of another would be plainly absurd.
Yet Plato at 440E5 speaks of 'Trjs
<ΐτ<χ<π£ , a "civil war in the psyche", and at 443D3-6
describes the parts' meddlesome tendency to usurp the functions of other parts. Talk of
usurpation or indeed any other activity of a faculty would be doubly absurd once we realize
that faculties are capacities, and capacities are no^agents; they require agents to employ
them, and usurpation is clearly the act of an agent.
Yet this talk of usurpation is
essential to Plato's view of injustice.
Another insuperable textual obstacle to taking the parts as faculties is found in
Plato's description of what it takes to inhibit such usurpation of function. At 442A-B
and 586E5 he prescribes education and training to induce each part to perform its own
function. Plainly one does not have to induce what cannot by definition be otherwise.
Facultist mistakes stem from a failure to take seriously Plato's isomorphism of polis
and psyche. At 441C6-7 he claims that there are the same number and kind of parts in the
psyche as in the polis. The parts of the polis were classes of people grouped together
not on the basis of their possessing one and only one capacity per group but on the basis
of the common predominant love or interest and common competence found in the group's mem
bers. With this isomorphism Plato commits himself to assigning parts of the psyche usurpable functions and the minimal versatility this presupposes.

he

Further evidence that Plato acts on this commitment may be found in the diverse names
gives to each part. To weigh this evidence fairly, however, we must for the time
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the part to which it is assigned. Given their history in faculty psychology and in inter
pretations influenced by it, the terms "Reason", "Spirit" and "Appetite" unfortunately do
exhaust or limit the capacity of anything to which they are applied in our context. It
will be prudent then to let the parts go incognito for a time, labelling them ^controver
sially as A, B and C, and noting the things Plato says and suggests about the desires,
capacities and activities of each in their names and descriptions.
One obstacle to doing this is the English^definite article which occurs in mechanical
renderings of Platonic expressions such as t o
We are often told this means
"The Desiderative" or "The Appetitive". This is misleading, however, for the connotations
of the English definite article differ substantially from those of Plato's neuter singular
To.
Plato's To was a standard Greek device for making a noun or piece of technical termi
nology out of anything to which it was prefixed. When so used it does not suggest "the one
and only", and thus provides no support for interpreters who treat a part of the psyche
labelled t o
as the one and only thing in the psyche capable on Plato's view of _____ .
These parts, we must remind ourselves, are isomorphic to usurpers and busybodies.
Even usurpers and busybodies have overriding or predominant loves, however, and lesser
desires over which these normally hold sway. One can be a lover of more than one thing. /
We should bear this in mind when Plato describes each part of the psyche with multiple <4^°. compounds. Part A, dominant in his philosopher-kings, is termed To
or "lover
of learning" and To c$Ckogo $ ov or "lover of wisdom" at 581B7. It is called Vo ΧογιG Tikoyr
or "calculative", as at 439D5, and is accordingly assigned the role of taking counsel :
(442B7) and exercising forethought on behalf of the entire psyche (441E5). Part B, domi
nant in his auxiliaries, is called to u?l\ovikov' , "lover of victory" and T O cPt\oT<^w-,
"lover of honor" (581B1-2) . It is also called To θαμοβι£<5£ , "spirited", as at 441A3.
Part C, strongest in people suited to be craftsmen, is termed To 4?ι\ο*χ^ μ<*Ύον ~, "lover of
money" or "lover of possessions" (580E7) , and To
, "lover of gain" (581A7) .
It is said to love food and drink (439D5-6), and is called Tr>
or "appetitive"
(439D7).
What relation holds between the multiple "loves" attributed to each part? Plato evi
dently did not conceive of these as miscellaneous and unrelated. At 357B4-D2 he had pointed
out that people value some things for their own sakes, others for their consequences, and
still others for both. The parts of the psyche resemble people of various political classes
in this respect as in most others. At 580E6 he calls part C To
or "lover
of money" in the very sentence in which he is explaining that it loves money because it is
most conducive to its ultimate end ( k it o T e \o u \r T c K i o i t ... eTftSuMiou ) , the satisfaction of
its appetites for food, drink and sex. Its regard for money is instrumental, much as its
regard for securing part A's superior logistical ássistance is at 553C-D. It does not love
thinking; it loves money and property as means to sensual gratification, and any regard it
has for calculative ability is regard for this ability as a means to obtaining money and
property. It is not indifferent to the instrumental value of thinking, and places some
value on it, though it is not said to love it.
It seems reasonable to suppose that among the various loves assigned to part B at
581A, the love of honor is primary, and victory, good reputation and rule are loved as
means to this, though Plato is not explicit on this point.
If there is an ordering of means and ends in the various things loved by a given part,
plainly there is nothing to prevent what is loved for its own sake by one part from being
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valued weakly as a means by another. At 441E5 part A is assigned the function of exercis
ing forethought on behalf of the entire psyche. At 442C4-8 it is charged with understand
ing and seeking what will benefit each part and the whole they comprise. To be concerned
for each part is to be concerned to quiet and satisfy each, as we see from 571D5-572B2.
Thus, as 586D8 indicates, part A will actually prescribe or approve
) certain
pleasures of gain and victory. The parts need not disagree in theiropinions about what
is of value and what is allowable. In a just person they will not disagree (442D), even
though their natural tendency is to disagree.
A common awareness of means/end relationships in each part suggests precisely the
sort of versatility a capacity for usurpation presupposes. It suggests a minimal capacity
we might call 'cognitive* even in part C. Plato's distaste for demotic or popular senses
of terms and for the ontological slum in which they have their use leads him to say that
part C is senseless (oLyc^tco , 605B9) , but this must be taken in much
the
wayone takes
his claim that none of the poleis Greeks lived in deserved to be called á polis (422E2423B2) . Often he reminds us that on his view a term's primary denotation is an ideal
paradigm and that things diverging widely from this scarcely deserve to have the term used
of them. In the psyche the ideal ruler and administrator was part A, but we must not let
his zeal in claiming its comparative superiority over parts B and C in this role obscure
the fact that he has endowed B and C with sufficient ability to usurp the role for a time,
if only to botch it. If part C were senseless in the way a rock is, there would be no ques
tion of its usurping A 's role. C is senseless more nearly in the way Cleon the Tanner was,
and foolish («Χογ^στον', 439D7) as he was also.
That Plato assigns a minimal level of 'cognitive' capacity to B and C is indicated in
a number of ways other than their corresponding to political factions which have this
capacity. At 571C, part C is said to be capable of devising elaborate dream plots while
part A sleeps. Thus part C has the ability to imagine complex scenarios, and it iscapa
ble of 'ruling' not simply in sleep but in the waking life of tyrants, on his view.
The parts are frequently depicted as being aware of one another. The story of Leontius
at 439E-440A suggests that part B combats and rebukes part C on occasion. Both parts are
depicted as being capable of obeying or following part A, which suggests that they are aware
of it and in communication with it (586D5-7, E3).
What the parts are aware of in one another are not merely desires but opinions. The
unleashing of part C at 571C is not simply the unleashing of many and dread appetites
(573D6-8) but the emancipation of certain opinions which were formerly freed only in sleep
(574D-E). That parts B and C hold opinions and hence may be said to "think that..." is
borne out at 603D where Plato speaks of us as having within ourselves contradictory opinions
about the same thing at the same time. He is well aware of what this implies when taken
together with his principle that the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same
respect stand in opposite relations to a second thing. In fact he reiterates at 604B his
view that one may distinguish parts in cases of internal conflict.
This has surprising antecedents and implications. The practice of the elenctic Socratic
dialectic in earlier dialogues and even in Bk. I of the Republic itself had made it glar
ingly obvious that the same person at ttjg same time can unwittingly hold two or more opin
ions which are in conflict on an issue.
But now Plato can explain how and why Socrates
was able to find contradictory opinions in the same person. We each have inferior parts
which tend to have inferior opinions. At 605C Plato speaks of a part which cannot distin
guish the greater and lesser, but believes t r [ y o a ^ c o ) that the same things are now one.
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goal is for all of the parts to agree in their opinions (442D3), for the person whose parts
these are accordingly to be of one mind (603D).
Although the passage from 603-5 is more explicit than any in Bk. IV, it makes gg break
with the views expressed in IV, and is in fact anticipated there in its essentials.
When
Plato at 437A stated his view that the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same
respect be, do or suffer opposites, he made it quite inclusive enough for later application
to thoughts and opinions. And in fact he immediately suggests such an application at 437B
when he gives as his first example of a pair of opposites suggesting a division in the psyche
/ro β'ΠίΝΓέίΑβίν', "nodding assent" or "approving", and 'to h v a s re a e w /', "nodding dissent" or
"disapproving".
Part B is said to be not only capable of having opinions but to be in need of intelli
gent communication either from the wisdom-loving part A within the person himself or perhaps
from other persons' wisdom-loving parts. At 550B Plato speaks of bad communications in
connection with the nurture of morally and politically inferior persons. As early as 410D
he had claimed that To 6u^oet6es, which emerges as the "spirited" part B in Bk. IV, will
become brave if rightly trained, but brutal, harsh and savage otherwise. He describes the
training it needs as
or "music". But "music" includes \ o y o i or accounts, as 376E377A indicates. Plato holds that the honor-loving part B has need of stories, fables and
the like to tame its wilder tendencies. And at 441A2-4 he claimed that it naturally heeds
the instructions of the wisdom-loving part provided it has not been corrupted. If it heeds
such instructions, stories and fables, then it must be able to understand them, much as the
soldiers to whom it corresponds are. If it can understand them it is not devoid of sense.
This is not to say that parts B and C left to their own devices can think in such a
way as to arrive at true opinions, on Plato's view, far less preserve any true opinion they
may be given. They correspond, after all, to politicians for whose opinions he had only
contempt, as one will recall from 425E-426E. He had a similar contempt for the indigenous
opinions of parts B and G, especially C.
But this raises a difficult question for Plato's conception of psychic justice. If
parts B and C dimly discern means to ends, and have distinct opinions of their own, how
is it possible for part A to dislodge their seditious opinions and achieve psychic harmony
and justice? How can it rule over rivals which are neither weak nor stupid?
On the face of it one might think it impossible for part A to rule over B and C. He
pointedly calls C "the mass of the psyche" (442A6
), and likens it to an immense, many
headed hydra caged with a small lion and a tiny human being (588Bff.). He tells us that
it is the task of this tiny human being to tame and rule the other two beasts with which
it is caged. But having depicted them as powerful beasts he makes one wonder how on his
view one might tame and rule them. Indeed, he makes one wonder whether justice in the
psyche, so conceived, is possible at all. If one thinks justice in the polis is neverthe
less possible, one must then ask whether justice in the polis and justice in the psyche can
be the same, as Plato claimed, especially if justice in the polis must have its source in
psychic justice. Questions about how psychic justice can be achieved thus return to plague
Platons claim that justice in the polis is justice in the psyche writ large.
Plato's tale of the beasts was confessedly a simile, however, not a piece of psycho
logical theorizing. On his actual theory, these parts are not beasts which the best part
must master but more nearly bullies — large, selfish and overbearing people. Since they
correspond not to beasts but to people, they are being likened to persuadable agents. These
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parts hold opinions, and one opinion can be exchanged for another in the process of persua
sion. We know that Plato’s goal was unanimity between the parts (442D2) . But does Plato
go so far in his isomorphism of polis and psyche that he posits an internal, psychic coun
terpart to the process of persuasion?
He does. In the Republic itself Plato's model of a person's internal thought-processes
is unabashedly discursive. At 574D-E he speaks of a conflict in the tyrant's psyg^e between
opinions accounted just and opinions normally restricted to expression in dreams.
Between
the discrete opinion-holding agents in the psyche there can be bad communications, and one
part may well cry out in protest at another (550B, 439E) . In the psyche which overcomes
such problems one part tells soothing stories to another, calming, pacifying and 'charming'
it (441E-442A, 607B1-608B3).
The view that thought is internal discourse is made still more explicit in the
Theaetetus and Sophist. At Theaetetus 189E Plato characterizes a person's Xoy os or
account as the decisive utterance resulting from a conversation of the psyche with itself,
a conversation complete with questions, answers, affirmations and denials. Given that this
is precisely what one would expect on the theory of the psyche as composed of agent-like
parts, and given that Plato continues to hold that theory as late as Sophist (227Eff.),
Timaeus (69B-72D) and Laws (626D-627B, 689D) , it is plain that on his view this internal
conversation takes place between distinct parts of the psyche. Again, at Sophist 263E he
suggests that the thought of a person and the account given by the person are the same,
with only one important difference: thought is the silent internal dialogue of the psyche
with itself, while an account is "the stream that flows from the psyche through the
mouth".
If such internal conversations as Plato posits can contain questions, answers, affir
mations and denials, it seems a small matter to add that some answers and affirmations
might be persuasive, and others not. Again this was anticipated in thé Republic : Plato
spoke of the gentleness and persuasiveness of the wisdom-loving part, and of the brutality
and force to which the other parts tend (589B-D) . The wisdom-loving part A is to study
unity or harmony with an eye to what will help it achieve first of all one crucial sort of
harmony -- harmony of belief between it and other parts of the psyche. At 442D2-3 Plato
claims that all parts must believe together that the wisdom-loving part must rule. And the
person in whom it does rule will bend all his or her efforts to studies which will help
engender a condition of moderation, justice and wisdom (591B). What sorts of studies might
these be? And how are they related to justice in the polis?
The answer is illuminated by a more informative and explicit passage matching 591B at
Phaedrus 229E-230A. There Socrates is made to remark that he has no time at all for investi
gating the truth about Boreas, the Centaurs, the Chimera, or the like:
For me there is no leisure at all for these things. The reason for this is that I
am not yet able to understand myself in accordance with the Delphic inscription: so
it appears to me ludicrous to investigate alien things when I do not understand that.
Whence I am pleased to let these things go, and being persuaded by the customary view
about them, ..., I investigate myself rather than these things — whether I happen to
be a more complex beast than Typhon, or whether I am a more domesticated and g^mpler
animal who shares by nature in a certain divine portion and is not puffed up.
This passage suggests not merely the priorities of the wisdom-loving part at its best,
but the principal source from which this part can gain additional influence over the other
parts, as we shall see. This key study is self-study or literally psychology, the study
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of self-study, for at 255D he suggests that others with whom we converse are like mirrors
in which we can see ourselves reflected. Attention one might expend upon the study of
mythology or even the trees and country places is better spent upon self-study, the exami
nation of the psyche's complexities, Socrates suggests. Why?
The business of the wisdom-loving part is to guide the other parts by persuasion, to
transplant into alien parts its own opinions, or, more accurately, opinions corresponding
in content to its knowledge. It is not likely to succeed in doing this unless it recog
nizes the number and nature of those alien parts. Thus at 270Cff. Plato calls for a full
study of these on the model of Hippocratic studies in medicine. The focus of such studies
will be the things each part does or endures, and what affects each in what ways. Above
all, such studies will focus on the effects of different sorts of discourses on different
parts of the psyche.
The function of discourse, Plato suggests at 271B, is to lead the psyche by persuasion.
Presumably this is the function of those speeches of one part to another required by the
sober dialectical passages in Republic, Theaetetus and Sophist mentioned above, and by the
myth of the charioteer and his horses in the Phaedrus itself (254C-D). As 271A suggests,
the wisdom-loving part is to learn towards what each of the other parts is inclined. And
it must understand that different parts, like different people, are moved by quite differ
ent sorts of appeals. The wisdom-loving part, like the wisdom-loving person ruled by this
very part, must learn what each part loves and mu^g construct discourses which are effective
owing to their promising each part what it loves.
The prerequisites for self-mastery and
the prerequisites for political mastery are precisely the same on Plato's view— an ade
quate, psychologically sophisticated rhetoric.
The political importance of this has long been recognized by commentators on the
Phaedrus, but its psychological and moral importance have not, with the result that it
has often struck readers as quite uncertain why Plato would write a single dialogue dealing
in succession^Yith the seemingly miscellaneous and disparate topics of love, the psyche
and rhetoric.
But under the interpretation I am suggesting, the Phaedrus' sequence of
topics makes excellent sense. It makes more explicit the Republic's notion that a person's
constituent psychic parts may each be understood in terms of what it loves, and that each
of these parts may be influenced by discourses offering it hope of attaining what it loves.
The Phaedrus provides evidence that in his discussion of rhetoric Plato is talking
not simply about how to persuade plebeians. He suggests that persuading plebeians begins
at home, within one's own psyche. He evidently saw intra-personal communication as more
important than inter-personal communication, and as the basis for it, in fact, much as
justice in the psyche was the basis for overt justice at Republic 443Cff. At 267A, for
example, he claimed that the account, discourse or speech 'written* in the psyche itself
is the most important of all, not the discourse the rhetorician writes out for others to
read. At 278A7-B1 he noted that the most legitimate offspring of the genuine rhetorician
will be the account or discourse 'written* in his own psyche. This is not a recommendation
that the rhetorician memorize his speeches. He is recommending that the best part of the
psyche lead the other parts by discourse, that it lead them to unity or harmony in belief and
action. To implant an account in one's own psyche is for one part of the psyche to implant
it not in itself, which is scarcely necessary, but in alien parts. The part which does the
implanting is part A. Only when this implanting has been done is the possessor of this
wisdom-loving part qualified to lead others by his craft. Like the true physician at
Gorgias 514Dff., the true rhetorician must cure himself first. The cure consists in ridding
oneself of internal dissent and faction, achieving the unanimity of belief held up as a goal
at Republic 442D.

-
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But this goal for the psyche is likened to health in the body at Pháedrus 270B7,
thus reinforcing the impression made by Gorgias 479B9, 486D, Républic 444D-E, 476E2,
571Dff., 584E6, and 603B1. And Plato holds that this goal is attainable by verbal means —
by the use^of words so rem^çkable in their effect that he terms them or "charms" and likens
them to JHcLpjAdLHKk o r drugs.
Yvon Bres and Anthony Kenny have recognized and doc^çented
Plato's pioneering role in developing beyond metaphor a concept of mental health.
But
Plato played a comparable role in developing i ^ n o t devising a concept of psychotherapy by
verbal means, as Lain-Entralgo has recognized.
Plato's Socrates (perhaps with mockmodesty) concedes a debt to the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis' school. At Charmides
157A he remarks that he learned from these physicians that
...the treatment of the soul ... is by means of certain charms, and these charms
are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered
in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and^resent we may easily secure
health to the head and the rest of the body also.
Whether the concession of a debt here is serious or ironic, there is abundant evidence
that Plato carries the notion of the treatment of the psyche very far, integrating it
with his theory of the parts. This theory as he develops it is capable of accounting for
the power of such Zalmoxian words or "charms".
Plato's theory of the power of woçgs is modelled upon Greek theories of nutrition,
according to which like feeds on like.
Previously we have seen that on Plato's view a
Xo-y$s or account proceeds from a particular part of the psyche. But it also proceeds in
a sense to a particular part, which it then nourishes or feeds. At Republic 590E5-591A2
Plato notes that our aim in controlling children.is to foster or treat the best part in
them by means of the best part in ourselves, establishing a similar guardian in them, and
only then leaving them free. His term
has both nutritive and therapeutic
connotations, as one would expec^when it was used by one who evidently followed Hippocratic
medical developments so closely.
This nutritive and dietetic view of the treatment of the psyche is expressed in Plato's
criticisms of actual poets, dramatists, sophists and rhetoricians in thé Republic. At
605B-C Plato criticizes the mimetic poet for pleasing an unreasonable part of the psyche.
To please such a part, he suggests, is to feed it a hearty meal and thus to increase its
strength and vitality relative to the other parts (606A-E, 585B4, 585D5-7, 589B7). Poetry
and music which please the possession-loving part C he found psychologically, morally and
politically unhealthy, and he complains of them accordingly at 411A-412A, 404D-E, and 607A.
Plato's ground for recommending that traditional poetry and music be censored is not
ascetic, if by "ascetic" one means to suggest an antipathy to any satisfaction of the
possession-loving and honor-loving parts, for at 571E he does advise that these be neither
starved nor overfed, and at 586E6-587A1 he notes that under the rule of the wisdom-loving
part these parts will enjoy their own appropriate pleasures. The proposal that the poets
be censored proceeds from Plato's view that they fail to understand that the possessionloving part is already quite large and overbearing, the mass of the psyche in each of us
(442A; Cp. Laws 689A-B). In their ignorance these poets stuff what needs a reducing diet.
They overfeed it by describing in attractive terms their character's excessive sensual
gratification. And since these poets find it difficult to imitate a moderate and stable
model of which they are largely ignorant in any case, they starve the very part which on
his view needs feeding (605E-606A).
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Yet it is possible and on Plato's view desirable to contrive poetry, music and rhetoric
which quiet and soothe the possession-loving and honor-loving parts and thus render them
more easily satisfied and more nearly in tune with the wisdom-loving part (606B-607A).
Indeed, it seems likely thatjgthe function of his own myths is to do just that to his readers,
<as Gorgias 493B-D suggests.
Note that they often deal with honors, victories and ambro
sial satisfactions, albeit in an after-life. These are the very things which on his own
view the wisdom-loving part of the psyche is least interested in. Such stories are
co§oU
addressed then not to the part which cares for truth and genuineness but to parts concerned
with reputation, honor, and sensual gratification.
It may be a bit disconcerting to read Plato with the suspicion that he sometimes tried
to appeal not merely to what he viewed as our wiser parts but to what he viewed as our unwise
and gullible ones as well. It is perhaps slightly unsettling to think that he may be trying
not merely to inform but to reform the reader. But on reflection, it would have been inap
propriate for him to have done less than
this if he held the views attributed
to him in this study. To his credit, he usually employs appeals to honor and sensual appe
tite only after he has already tried to make his case in the straightforward dialectical
way appropriate for an appeal to the wisdom-loving part. This is the case at Phaédo 114D,
where he sums up the import of the beliefs he has been recounting since 108E, having already
offered such arguments as he can to the same effect, though without such covert appeals to
appetite as one sees at 113Eff. Similarly in the Myth of Er at Republic 619B-620E, the
appeal is clearly to the possession-loving and honor-loving parts, which not only feel cer
tain pleasures of indulgence but associated pains of deprivation and the threat of it; the
threat posed to them here is evident.
At Gorgias 523Aff., the same sort of threat to the honor-loving and possession-loving
parts may be recognized in the talk of a judgment after death, dungeons, stripes and the
like inflicted upon a naked psyche, talk admittedly offered to reinforce the more reasonable
appeals made earlier. Compare, for example, 527B-E with 497D, where Socrates had argued
that good things are not the same as pleasant ones, nor bad things the same as unpleasant
qnes; yet 527B-E dwells upon the pains, tortures, retributions and the like allegedly await
ing the evil person after death. Socrates' concern, as he reminds us at 500C, is with that
way of life which is best, and on his view such a way of life depends upon law and order
in the psyche (504D), which requires the restraining of passions (505B), a process of
restraint which, I submit, he himself embarks upon in this myth. As he had noted at 503D.-E,
in a passage which I take to apply to his own writing as he saw it, Plato remarks,
...the good man, who is intent upon the best when he speaks, will surely not speak
at random in whatever he says, but with a view to some object. He is just like
any other craftsman who, having his own particular work in view, selects the things '
he applies to that work of his, not at random^but with the purpose of giving a
certain form to whatever he is working upon".
The form which is of most interest to Plato in such contexts is
(Republic
445C6), which is health, good condition, or good order in the psyche (Republic 444D10-E1,
Gorgias 504D-E). That good order is an arrangement of parts, as we have seen. Merely to
make a straightforward dialectical case with no supplementary use of myths and charming
stories would on Plato's view be to appeal solely to less than a third of one's hearer or
reader — to a beleaguered fraction in love with wisdom already and in need of reinforce
ments in its attempt to unify or harmonize the psyche (Republic 527D-E). Stories which
soothe and quiet parts B and C also increase the relative strength of part A, the wisdomloving one.
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In a good state such reinforcements would come from without in the form of carefully
chosen myths, music and poetry. In the poor states in which people actually live one may
have to provide these for oneself. Indeed, Plato’s positing an internal use of rhetoric
and of "charms” in the Phaedrus as at Republic 608A provides a theoretic framework for this
self-persuasive enterprise. And he had already described Socrates as engaged in what looks
very like such an enterprise. One of the more striking passages occurs near the end of the
Phaedo, where Socrates recounts an elaborate myth about an after-life and much else. Upon
completing it he remarks, at 114D-E,
Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just
as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our
souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may
properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth-while; and
he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were maggg charms, which is
the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long.
Note that Socrates recommends telling oneself such stories for the reassuring and calming
effect they may have, and that immediately upon concluding this remark he calmly begins
his final preparations to drink the hemlock and die. He has told a lengthy tale which he
will not confidently claim is true, and has done so for the effect it has upon himself.
The tale has been told, then, as an éTra;br¡, a "charm" answering both to Socrates' expressed
eagerness to make himself believe that the psyche is immortal at 91A9-B1 and to the corres
ponding eagerness of Cebes and Simraias at 77E. Significantly, his friends here do not wish
to be regarded as themselves afraid of death, but as having perhaps a child within them who
has such a fear. They regard Socrates as expert in charming away such fears, and suspect
no one else can do it, but he tells them that they must themselves sing charms
,
E8-9 ) to this child daily until they charm away the fear. This anticipates Republic 608A.
Laws 665C carries this line of thought even further, making this self-treatment into a
civic duty.
If Socrates addresses tales to his own psyche, and advises Cebes and Simmias to do
likewise, then he locates both the physician and the patient in the same psyche. On the
interpretation of the Republic1s theory developed here this is explicable. Much as the
best part of one person's psyche can treat the best part in another's psyche (590E5ff.) ,
so the best part of a person's psyche can treat lesser, childish parts with which it
cohabits, if it has studied these parts and does not relax its guard (606A9) . Such a per
son can "provide a \o y o s for himself and others" (534B5) .
The person who has done this successfully on Plato's view turns up under a variety of
labels. This is the dialectician, the psychically healthy person, the true statesman who
knows what ig^best for the polis and how to get it, the psychologist, and the genuine
rhetorician.
But this is also the virtuous or excellent person: to be ruled or led by
a persuasively resourceful part which loves wisdom and harmonizes the other parts is to
have no compelling motive for any conduct which is not virtuous or excellent.
It has been argued above that the parts of the psyche as Plato describes them overlap
in a number of their capacities at a minimal level, and that thé very conceivability of
one part's usurping the role of another turns on this. This is not to say that the parts
overlap in all of their capacities even at a minimal level. Much as there aré people who
appear utterly devoid of certain capacities, thus making it appropriate to deny that they
have them at all, so the parts are conceived of as having or lacking certain capacities.
Part A, for example, is characterized as gentle, not forceful or violent, and it is plainly

beyond its capacity overpower the other parts by brute strength/ as part B might overpower
the others in anger or part C in hunger, thirst or sexual desire. If it utterly lacks
sheer brute force, however, it is compensated for this by possessing a potential for deep
psychological understanding of the other parts and a persuasive power predicated upon that
understanding which parts B and C utterly lack. The rule of part B is reflected in the
behavior of people whose psyches it rules. They do not persuade; they rely rather on
harshness (549A1) and force in ruling (548B7). Those whose psyches are ruled by part C do
not keep down evil desires by persuading themselves that they had better not indulge them,
but keep them down, if at all, only out of fear for the loss of their possessions (554D2-3).
IV
That the parts of the psyche are so conceived that they overlap in certain capacities
but not others only serves to make them all the more like the people to whom they correspond.
This brings us, finally, to an almost-inevitable reservation one must at least entertain
about Plato's theory as interpreted here. In fact, if this reservation is thought seriously
unflattering to Plato, and Plato is thought deserving of flattery, one may J^ink
reser~
vation damaging to the interpretation itself rather than to Plato's theory.
The reservation has to do with likening anything whatever to a human being. It would
be easy to caricature the theory as portrayed here as if it involved Plato in positing a
committee of homonculi animating each person. Indeed, it is evident that a number of inter
preters have been deterred from offering the sort of interpretation developed here, despite
the te^jjuai evidence for it, owing to the seeming absurdity of the view it attributes to
Plato.
One can understand the reluctance to recognize in Plato's theory so sweeping an
anthropomorphism. People are scarcely our current paradigms of constancy or intelligibility.
The theory may appear to have gone so far in its anthropomorphism that it incorporates at
a new level the very sorts of problems it was designed to illuminate. If we are curious,
as Plato evidently was, why a tyrant lacks self-control, it will scarcely impress us to be
told that this is owing to his being ruled within by a mini-tyrant who lacks self control
(575C5-D2). This internal agent may seem all-too-like the one whose foibles motivated the
theory in the first place. The explanatory power of a theory positing such an agent within
may seem to rank about as low as that of Anaxagoras' alleged view that everything is what
it contains the mosg^of, and that what it contains the most of is readily apparent in its
sensible qualities.
This sort of problem has been rggognized in the literature before, but has not to my
knowledge had an adequate treatment.
The dangers it poses are not confined to a seeming
dearth of explanatory power. On the pattern of explanation Plato employs, namely the pat
tern of explaining the action of a whole as the overt action of a part within a whole, one
may wonder why, if at all, one cannot then ask about the action of th|£ part, treating it
in turn as a whole, and so embarking upon a vicious infinite regress.
The more closely
Plato assimilates parts of the psyche to people, the more he appears to invite this regress.
Such a regress of parts-within-parts could make nonsense of Plato's theory as interpreted
in this study.
The regress problem is the easier of the two to deal with, for it can be solved on
textual grounds alone, without appealing to extra-Platonic notions such as that of explana
tory power.
A regress of parts-within-parts could make nonsense of Plato's
here only if Plato were so engrossed in making the parts correspond
the parts subject to the same sorts of problems which motivated him
These, it will be recalled, were problems of internal conflict, and

theory as interpreted
to people that he made
to posit parts initially,
the incoherence which

seems to result from not recognizing it. But did he describe any part of the psyche as
being beset by the sorts of conflict suffered by a person such as Leontius?
It is important to recognize here that not just any internal conflict in a part will
be sufficient to get an infinite (and hence vicious) regress going. An infinite regress
would require that the conflicts be between sub-parts isomorphic to the tripartite person,
sub-parts which love wisdom for its own sake, honor for its own sake, and sensual gratifi
cation for its own sake, all of these sub-parts within the honor-loving part itself, for
example. But there is not the slightest evidence that Plato regarded any of the parts of
the psyche as isomorphic in structure to the entire tripartite psyche. There is evidence
that he recognized conflicts within part C, and hence that he was committed to regarding
at least that part as having sub-parts. But these conflicts are between sub-parts given
to different sorts of sensual appetites, not ÿ^e familiar conflicts between a sensual part,
an honor-loving one, and a wisdom-loving one.
^
It is still more important however to recall that Plato terms the parts of the psyche
eci>r¡, a term usually rendered "forms" elsewhere.
The paradeigmatic forms are not animate,
as the parts of the psyche are, a n d ^ y not translating e lê & s as "form" in its psychologies

use we prevent a certain confusion.
But we may also overlook an affinity Plato wished
to acknowledge. One of the crucial characteristics of a paradeigmatic form such as equalit;
was its purity; it was to contain no tincture of anything incompatible with it (Phaedo
74B-C) . The
ψίλ}(η5 are "pure" in a related way, despite their being essentially
active. They are, each of them, pure and constant in their priorities. And in this crucia
respect they differ from the people to whom they correspond by as vast a margin as heat doe;
from a fire.

^ A t 581B1, for example, the honor-loving part B is said to be wholly set upon (oXoV
t) ruling, winning and good reputation. There is, as argued earlier, a means-end
relationship even among these three things which part B is set upon, but Plato's point here
appears to be that anything other than these three is never valued by this part save as a
means to one or more of these. The lover of something loves all of it (475B5) , cannot get
enough of it (475C9), and welcomes it on any pretext (475A7). Plainly no person, no matter
how fanatical or crazed, is likely to measure ujd to the Platonic description "lover of ___ "
A lover of ____ is a stereotype, a paradigm, an e l^ o s
which a person can only approximate.' 1
part of the psyche on this view is such an.¿í§o5 t a stereotypically constant lover of one
sort of thing for its own sake, and of others merely as means to this if at all.
No person containing several such stereotypical
set quite insatiably on disparate
goals could easily measure up to any one of them fully. People, living in the realm of
becoming (525B5) , cannot easily rise out of it and ignore what any part demands. Unlike
their psychic parts, people contain independent and inherently fractious parts. The parts
of the psyche Plato posits then cannot mirror the exact sorts of factions and confusions
about priorities to which people are prone. His isomorphism of polis and psyche cannot
generate a vicious infinite regress, for the political agents in the psyche are fjgm the
beginning elevated into form-like stereotypes unwavering in their disparate aims.

There remains the question about the explanatory power of the theory. The question
runs well beyond the scope of this study and indeed the scope of Platonic scholarship itselJ
One must defer here to philosophers of science competent enough or audacious enough to haz
ard a measure of explanatory power. One may well defer also to philosophers interested in
assessing witho^g prejudice the philosophical merits and demerits of anthropomorphism and
paradeigmatism.

-Jr

-15It is perhaps appropriate to remind ourselves finally that the term "Platonist" has
two distinct senses: "One who studies and explicates the views of Plato", and "One who
adheres to and defends the views of Plato". One can scarcely adhere to and defend intelli
gently what has not been adequately explicated; hence the work of the Platonist in the
first sense is prior to that of the Platonist in the second. I have attempted in this
study to do only the first sort of work except where the philosophical defects seem to
have loomed so large for so long and to so many that it is difficult to entertain the argu
ment that Plato held views subject to them. To allow questions of the philosophical worth
or defensibility of Plato's views to have any more extensive effect than this upon a work
of interpretation is to risk proceeding on the unstated assumption that Plato's views —
whatever they were — are known a priori to be philosophically defensible. But ideas of
philosophical defensibility vary widely from place to place and time to time. Hence to
assume that Plato's views are known à priori to be philosophically defensible is tantamount
to making Platonism into a variable content religion, not a definite web of philosophical
positions. Among those called "Platonists", as among the denizens of thg^pólis Plato
envisions, a certain specialization and restriction of function is wise.
Jon Moline
The University of Wisconsin-Madison
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argument does not establish it.
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Cp. Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie deir Griechen, 4th Ed. (Leipzig, 1889), Vol. II,
p. 845.
22

See n. 2 above/ and G. F. Stout and J . M. Baldwin, Eds./ Dictionary of Philosophy
and Psychology (New York, 1901) , Vol. I, p. 369. Similar views were held in German faculty
psychology. Christian Wolff, for example, in his Vernünftige Gedanken Von den Kräften des
Menschen (Halle, 1738), characterized a faculty as à Fertigkeit (p. 144).
23
E.g., Cross and Woozley, pp. 123-4, and Hardie, p. 139.
24

Reid, pp. 47, 54 and 276, was clearly aware that a power requires an agent to use
it, that agent being the person. Cp. Robinson, pp. 47-8.
25

Thrasymachus1 claim that virtue is the interest of the stronger may be seen as an
expression of an unbridled part C; Laches1 claim at Laches 190E that "Courage is the will
ingness to stay at one's post, face the enemy, and not run away" seems an expression of
part B; Hippias1 all-too-revealing suggestion that "Beauty is nothing but gold" would be
a paradeigmatic expression of part C.
26Here I differ with Adam, Vol. II, p. 406, who finds something news C's opinions;
earlier he had recognized the internal dialogue posited at 437A (Vol. I, p. 249).
27

Commentators who, like Shorey and others, see Plato through the lens of faculty
psychology, fail to do justice to his insight into the normal disunity of consciousness
when they suggest that he was concerned to show the "synthetic unity of thought" (Shorey,
p. 45).
28

It will be readily apparent that Plato cannot conceive of the thought or opinion of
a part and that of a person along precisely the same lines without generating a regress.
How those lines differ is discussed in the final section below.
29
My translation.
^Bernard Williams, pp. 202-4, overlooks this point in Plato's argument, and concludes
as a result that there are grave obstacles to Plato's analogy between psyche and polis.
31
W. H. Thompson, The Pháedrus of Plato (London, 1869), pp. xiii-xiv, notes that diverse
views as to the leading idea of the dialogue are suggested by the various subtitles affixed
to it by even its Greek commentators — "Concerning Beauty", "Concerning Love", "Concerning
Rhetoric", "Concerning the Good", "Concerning the Psyche", etc. R. Hackforth, Plato1s
Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 8-10, also notes ancient and modern scholars' puzzlement
on the subjects and purposes of the dialogue.
^Meno 80A, Phaedo 77E, 78A, 114D; Charmides 156D-157A, 176B; Republic 426B, 364B,
608A; Theaetetus 149C, 157C; Laws 659E, 665C, 666C, 670E, 773D, 812C, 887D, 837E, 903B,
909B, 933D, 944B.
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Kenny (n. 9 above); Yvon Bres, La Psychologie de Platon (Paris, 1968), pp. 288-308.
See also 3 papers in G. Vlastos, Ed., Plato (Garden City, 1971), Vol. II, p. 55), G. Vlastos
(p. 68), and W. J. Verdenius (p. 264).
34
P. Lain-Entraigo, "Die platonische Rationalisierung der Besprechung (£ΪΤ$<ΔΗ ) und
die Erfindung der Psychotherapie durch das Wort", Hermes 86 (1958), pp. 298-323. Cp. Bres,
pp. 318-9.
35
The translation is that of Lamb in the Loeb Ed.
36
**
C. W. Muller, Gleiches zu Gleichen (Wiesbaden, 1965), esp. pp. 69-73, is useful on
such theories.
37
Phaedrus 270C-D provides only one of many indications of Plato's contact with
current medical ideas.
38
On the function of myth in Plato I disagree then with all who regard his myths as
means of expressing "higher truths" inaccessible to dialectical expression. G. S. Kirk,
Myth (Cambridge, 1970), p. 259, claims that Plato "uses myth as second-best". That suggests
that it is a forced alternative to dialectic, which seems misleading. Myth is the Platonic
therapy of choice for parts B and C, which are as indifferent to dialectical argument as
part A is to "purely evocative and imagistic" tales of "lands flowing with milk and honey".
Guthrie (p. 18) conflates the use of myth with mysticism.
39

Lamb transi., Loeb Ed.

^ L o e b transi., Loeb Ed.
41Phaedrus 266B, 269B, 271A-B, 278A, 273D-274A, 271D-272B.
42
As David Keyt has remarked, "One sometimes finds a philosophical objection to a
theory offered as an objection to a theory qua interpretation — even though it is a gross
non sequi tur to argue that a theory is a bad interpretation because it is a bad piece of
philosophy.
(But this fallacy is easily committed by Platonic scholars. One doesn't: want
the master to look bad.)" /"Plato on Falsity", in Lee, Mourelatos and Rorty, p. 286/.
43

Cross and Woozley, p. 129; Crombie, Vol. I, pp. 354-6; Hardie, p. 139. For a more
sanguine view, see E. R. Dodds, "Plato and the Irrational Soul", in Vlastos, Ed., Plato,
Vol. II, pp. 215-7.
44
Aristotle, Physics 187b2-8.
45

Leissner, p. 46; Cross and Woozley, p. 124; see also Wright Neely, "Freedom and
Desire", Philosophical Review 83 (Jan., 1974), pp. 42-3.
46

This problem was first recognized by Aristotle, De Anima 411b5-30.
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At Republic 558Cff. Plato offers the psychological basis in his theory for the overt
political conflict between potential oligarchs, tyrants and democrats, all of whom love
possessions. He distinguishes necessary and unnecessary
, and among the unneces
sary ones he distinguishes those that are "terrible, fierce and lawless" from those that
are not. The oligarch is ruled by the necessary desires, inhibiting the others. The demo
crat makes no distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires, and is influenced by
each in turn (561A-E). The tyrant is ruled by the lawless unnecessary desires, which hinder
other desires (574A).
48
This confusion may be encouraged by treating the psyche itself as an Idea, without
sufficient qualification, as A. J. Festugiere does in Contemplation et Vie Contemplative
selon Platon, 2nd Ed. (Paris, 1950), p. 122.
Another objection to conceiving of the parts as agent-like stereotypes deserves
mention. Hardie (pp. 139-40) and Cross and Woozley (p. 129) have argued that this con
ception would commit Plato to denying that persons could properly be held morally respon
sible for their actions. As Adkins has argued, however, the notion of moral responsibility
has no clear counterpart in classical Greek thought, even when applied to persons themselves
(Chapters 13-14). Had he wished to develop such a notion Plato was in a position to develop
a notion of sub-personal responsibility, the responsibility of the wisdom-loving part for
nourishing itself and for guiding the lesser parts.
50
For example, K. V. Wilkes, "Anthropomorphism and Analogy in Psychology", Philo
sophical Quarterly 25 (April, 1975), pp. 126-37.
51I am indebted to Charles Kahn and Phillip Cummins for comments on an earlier draft
of this study.

